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INTRODUCTION

Different jurisdictions across the world adopt different
models of national arbitration laws. These laws provide the
external parameters within which any arbitration taking place
in that country must fall.1 There are peculiarities in these laws,
whether it is in England,2 Germany,3 the United States4 or
other jurisdictions that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model
Law,5 for instance.

1 “External parameters” refers to the fact that the Rules chosen by parties
will primarily guide their proceedings. The domestic arbitration law
comes into play in these three situations: (1) to provide guidance where
parties have not agreed; (2) to supplement the Rules where the chosen
Rules do not provide for certain issues in the process; and (3) it applies
regardless of parties’ agreement where the provision is of a mandatory
character.
2 Arbitration Act 1996, 2 (Eng.).
3 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], §§ 1025-1066
(1998); see generally THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW - LEX FACIT ARBITRUM, 2
ARB. INT'L 241, 244 (1986). [hereinafter UNCITRAL]. (The German
Arbitration Act of 1998 is substantially based on the UNCITRAL Model
Law).
4 United States (Federal) Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-208, 301-307
(2018).
5 UNCITRAL, supra note 3. (As the name suggests, this is a model law
prepared and adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) with the hope that states will
incorporate or adopt its provisions into their domestic arbitration regime.
The current version was adopted in 2006. Presently, 78 states have
adopted this law in some form as their domestic arbitration law) See Status:
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with
Amendments_as_Adopted_in_2006,_UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985
Model_arbitration_status.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) (UNCITRAL is
also simply referred to as “the Model Law”).
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Unlike many other countries that are major venues for
international arbitration, the United States has not enacted the
UNCITRAL Model Law.6 In the U.S., the 92-year-old Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides the legislative framework
for arbitration.7 In general, the FAA, like the Model Law,
provides certain similar features and bases for international
arbitration. For instance, the FAA supports the principles of
party autonomy and limited local curial involvement in the
arbitration.8 Under the FAA, arbitration agreements are to be
enforced in accordance with their terms, and arbitral awards
are shielded from judicial review on the merits.9
Nonetheless, the FAA and the Model Law differ in
several ways, most notably with respect to: (1) the basis for
setting aside an award; (2) the power to modify or correct an
award; (3) the procedure for appointment of arbitrators; and,
most importantly, (4) the arbitral tribunal’s power to rule on
its own jurisdiction,10 which is the focus of this paper. Of
course, a well-drafted arbitration agreement that incorporates
recognized arbitration rules will render academic most, if not
all, of these differences, as the parties’ agreement will
generally trump or supplement the default provisions of the
FAA and the Model Law.
The differences between the FAA and Model Law may
be significant in situations where the parties’ agreement fails
to address some of these issues. In BG Group PLC v. Republic

Dana H. Freyer, The United States Federal Arbitration Act and the
UNCITRAL Model Law: How and Why are They Different?, IPBA JOURNAL
(Sept. 2006), at 29.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
6
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of Argentina, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of
arbitral jurisdiction.11 Notably, the BG Group arbitration was
an investment arbitration decided outside the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
framework.12 Because it was a non-ICSID investment
arbitration, the parties chose Washington, D.C., as the
juridical seat for the proceedings, which meant that the FAA
applied automatically as the lex arbitri. Consequently, certain
features of the FAA (or lack thereof) kicked in, particularly
with respect to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine
its own jurisdiction, the so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz.13 The
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle is treated much differently in
the U.S. under the FAA than in most other jurisdictions that

BG Group PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1204 (2014) (“[W]ho—
court or arbitrator—bears primary responsibility for interpreting and
applying the local litigation requirement to an underlying controversy?”).
12 In most cases, investor-state arbitrations are conducted under the
auspices of the ICSID. However, there is a certain category commonly
referred to as “non-ICSID investment arbitration.” These kinds of
investment arbitrations, as the name implies, are conducted outside
ICSID. Parties choose a juridical seat for the proceedings, thereby
subjecting the proceedings to the national law of the state.
13 See BG Group PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1204-05. (This paper utilizes the German
term “Kompetenz-Kompetenz”, meaning “jurisdiction concerning
jurisdiction,” largely for historical purposes, as the doctrine originated in
the German courts); See George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in
International Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 14 n.44 (2012); see
also Shirin Philipp, Is the Supreme Court Bucking the Trend? First Options v.
Kaplan in Light of European Reform Initiatives in Arbitration Law, 14 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 119, 134-38 (1996). (The doctrine refers to the ability of arbitrators to
rule on their own jurisdiction over a party or dispute); See Dominique T.
Hascher, Injunctions in Favor of and Against Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 189, 191 (2010) (The French term “compétence-compétence” denotes
the same principle).
11
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have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law. This difference is
responsible for the fact that in BG Group, the issue of
jurisdiction was appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.
The foregoing therefore raises the following questions: would
this dispute have been resolved much quicker than the eleven
years it took, if it were decided under the Model Law? Are
states better off leaving their investment disputes to be
decided under the ICSID framework? Would KompetenzKompetenz in the U.S. be clearer, and therefore more efficient,
if there were an express textual basis under the FAA?
In this paper, I will focus not so much on the substance
of the decision in BG Group; rather, I will utilize the BG Group
decision as a platform to discuss the differences in the
treatment of Kompetenz-Kompetenz under the U.S. system, the
FAA, and the UNCITRAL regime. The FAA does not
expressly provide for Kompetenz-Kompetenz—this principle
derives from U.S. jurisprudence. In Part II, I will reexamine
the jurisprudence that American courts have developed to
address the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. This will
necessarily involve exploring the principle of arbitrability as
a mechanism utilized by U.S. courts to determine arbitral
jurisdiction. Part III discusses Kompetenz-Kompetenz under the
UNCITRAL regime, highlighting the clear textual foundation
it provides for Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Part III also looks at the
limitations on the exercise of this authority. Part IV provides
a brief comparative analysis from different jurisdictions to
showcase how courts have applied this principle in other
parts of the world. Part V shows how this principle was
applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in BG Group. I conclude
with some recommendations in Part VI.

414
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KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ IN THE UNITED STATES

A. THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
After “The doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, as
generally understood, recognizes the authority of arbitral
tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction.14 The breadth of
this formulation has unfortunately generated much
misunderstanding.”15 The FAA, unlike most other arbitration
statutes, does not expressly provide, in clear language, for this
authority. Section 3 of the FAA refers to motions to stay court
proceedings where issues before the court are subject to
arbitration. This section “is notorious among world
arbitration statutes for its failure to incorporate the
[K]ompetenz-[K]ompetenz doctrine.”16 It reads:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of
the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which
such suit is pending upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement,
shall on application of one of the parties stay the
trial of the action until such arbitration has been
had in accordance with the terms of the

Bermann, supra note 13, at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
16 Natasha Wyss, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach
to Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 72 TUL. L. REV. 351, 355 (1997) (quoting Thomas
E. Carbonneau, Beyond Trilogies: A New Bill of Rights and Law Practice
Through the Contract of Arbitration, 6 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 17 (1995)).
14
15
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agreement, providing the applicant for the stay
is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.17
In addition to staying the proceedings, section 4
provides for authority of the court to compel arbitration. It
reads in part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure,
neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under
a written agreement for arbitration may petition
[the court] . . . for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for
in such agreement.18
These provisions of the FAA come closest to textually
addressing the threshold issue of arbitral jurisdiction. As is
hopefully evident from these provisions, they empower the
court only to decide such threshold issues.19 On the FAA
provisions’ face, however, they appear to exclude arbitral
authority to make such a decision.20 This position was
subsequently espoused in case law.21
In giving effect to the FAA, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals gradually adopted a “federal policy that, when
construing arbitration agreements, every doubt is to be

United States (Federal) Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2018) (emphasis
added).
18 Id. § 4.
19 Wyss, supra note 16, at 356.
20 See Adriana Dulic, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and the
Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 77, 79 (2002).
21 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
17
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resolved in favor of arbitration.”22 Indeed, so widespread was
the adoption of this “policy” that by 1981 the Seventh Circuit
felt comfortable declaring it “axiomatic.”23 On the basis of this
lower court consensus, the Supreme Court itself ruled in 1983
that, “as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration[.]”24
B. FIRST OPTIONS: REVERSE PRESUMPTION
ACTIVISM?

AND

JUDICIAL

The “presumption of arbitrability” seemed to suggest
that the arbitration panel, rather than the court, would be
empowered to determine the arbitrability of disputes unless
the parties expressly agreed that arbitrability would be
decided by a court. After all, if “doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues” were to be resolved in favor of
arbitration, then any doubt regarding who was to decide
arbitrability should likewise be resolved in favor of
arbitration, at least absent a clear agreement to the contrary.25
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rejected this
conclusion in 1995. The Court utilized the opportunity in First

Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981) (citations
omitted).
23 Id.
24 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
25 Deciding Who Decides Questions of Arbitrability: A Survey of American Law
and a Comparative Perspective, QUINN EMANUEL TRIAL LAWYERS,
https://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/news-events/articlenovember-2015-deciding-who-decides-questions-of-arbitrability-asurvey-of-american-law-and-a-comparative-perspective/ (last visited
Mar. 26, 2018).
22
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Options to define the bounds of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in
American jurisprudence.26 In its opinion, the Court took a
contractual view of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, in the sense that its
existence is solely based on a “‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’”
agreement of the parties, which could be determined from the
language of the agreement.27 Thus, under this “clear and
unmistakable” standard, American courts begin their
jurisdictional analysis with the presumption that tribunals do
not have Kompetenz-Kompetenz to determine jurisdiction.28
This implies that in order to overcome this presumption, a
party must show that it agreed to submit the “arbitrability
question” to arbitral determination.29 In dictum in First
Options, the Supreme Court “supplied a verbal hook” on
which the analysis of Kompetenz-Kompetenz “has been hung.”
Subsequent cases, including BG Group, invariably “cite First
Options for the dual proposition that (i) contracting parties
may agree to arbitrate jurisdictional matters (questions about

Ashley Cook, Kompetenz-Kompetenz: Varying Approaches and a Proposal for
a Limited Form of Negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 17, 24
(2014).
27 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 944).
28 See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. The Court employs a higher threshold
requirement for parties to provide a tribunal with Kompetenz-Kompetenz;
in contrast, the arbitrability of a merits issue is given the presumption of
assent by the Court when the agreement is silent as to the particular issue,
but the Court reverses the presumption on the jurisdictional issue. Id. at
944-45. The Court’s rationale was that it is less likely that a party will
realize that it is forfeiting its jurisdictional right when it signs an
arbitration agreement. Id. at 945.
29 See William W. Park, Determining an Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction: Timing and
Finality in American Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 135, 156-57 (2007).
26

418

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 25

“arbitrability”) but (ii) such agreement must be founded on
clear evidence.”30
In First Options, an arbitral award had been rendered
against both an investment company and its owners with
respect to debts owed to a securities clearing house. The
owners (the Kaplans) argued that they had never signed the
arbitration agreement and consequently were not bound by
the award. The Supreme Court carefully distinguished
between three questions: (i) did the Kaplans owe money (the
substantive merits)? (ii) did the Kaplans agree to arbitrate
(jurisdiction, which the Court called “arbitrability”)? And (iii)
Who (court or arbitrator) should decide whether the Kaplans
agreed to arbitrate (which the Court called the “standard of
review” question)?31
On the facts of this case, the Supreme Court held that
the Kaplans had not agreed to arbitrate. The Court decided
this without any judicial deference to the arbitrator’s
determination.32 Whether the Kaplans were bound to
arbitrate by virtue of a clause signed by their investment

Id. at 157.
First Options, 514 U.S. at 942. Question (iii) was the main issue in BG
Group regarding the interpretation of the local litigation requirement of
the bilateral investment treaty. The Court stated:
[T]he question before us is who—court or arbitrator—
bears primary responsibility for interpreting and
applying Article 8’s local court litigation provision. Put in
terms of standards of judicial review, should a United
States court review the arbitrators’ interpretation and
application of the provision de novo, or with the deference
that courts ordinarily show arbitral decisions on matters
the parties have committed to arbitration?
BG Group PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1206 (2014).
32 First Options, 514 U.S. at 947.
30
31
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company was a question for the courts. It was for a judge, not
arbitrator, to provide the ultimate determination on whether
Mr. and Mrs. Kaplan were in fact bound to arbitrate by reason
of the actions of their investment company, on theories such
as agency, alter ego, or lifting the corporate veil. The Court
went further and suggested that “the arbitrability question
itself” might be submitted to arbitration.33 What then is
“arbitrability”?
C. ARBITRABILITY AS A TOOL FOR KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ
Arbitrability is a term of art. It is fair to state that the
term “arbitrability” in the U.S. has a broader meaning than
the traditional meaning accorded this term in other parts of
the world. The disparity in meaning contributes to the lack of
clarity in the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the U.S.
Arbitrability in the U.S. “denote[s] every condition or
requirement that must be met in order for an arbitration to go
forward.”34 This version of arbitrability encompasses an array
of diverse issues.35 This poses the following questions: “Does
an agreement to arbitrate exist?36 Is that agreement valid and
enforceable?37 Are both parties signatories to the agreement

Id. at 943.
Bermann, supra note 13, at 10.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
37 See, e.g., AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643
(1986).
33
34
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or otherwise bound by it?38 Does the agreement cover the
particular dispute at hand?”39
Other questions commonly characterized as issues of
arbitrability include where a party resisting arbitration argues
that the other party has failed to satisfy a condition precedent
to arbitration,40 or that some other barrier to arbitration stands
in arbitration’s way, whether time limits on the underlying
claim41 or the principle of res judicata.42 Thus, court decisions
in the US speak of the “arbitrability question” in the same way
that the rest of the world refers to jurisdictional issue.43 The
American approach asks not only “who decides what,” but
also “who decides who decides.”44
On the other hand, the term may be used in a much
narrower sense, confined to one specific question: Did the
legislature, in establishing or recognizing a particular cause of

See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964).
See, e.g., Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir.
2008); Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Niles Audio Corp., 401 F.3d 529, 532-33 (3d Cir.
2005); Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2004); Cap Gemini
Ernst & Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 2003).
40 See, e.g. Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 102728 (11th Cir. 1982); Eady v. Bill Heard Chevrolet Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1284,
1286 (M.D. Ala. 2003). This was one of the arguments advanced by the
Republic of Argentina in the BG Group decision. Argentina argued that the
Article 8 local litigation requirement under the UK-Argentina BIT was a
condition precedent to arbitration. Consequently, Argentina essentially
submitted that the issue fell in the realm of arbitrability and therefore
within the competence of the Court to decide, based on First Options.
41 See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
42 See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of
Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623 (1988).
43 Park, supra note 29, at 145.
44 Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
287 (1999).
38
39
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action, authorize its adjudication by an arbitral tribunal, or
did the legislature reserve its adjudication to courts of law?45
This is the more widespread understanding of the term in
other parts of the world. This meaning is evidenced in the
“non-arbitrability” ground found both in the 1958 New York
Convention46 and in the UNCITRAL Model Law47. Used in
this way, arbitrability denotes only one of the many objections

This is notably how the term is most often employed in international
arbitration. See, e.g. NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 122 (student ed. 2009) (“Arbitrability
…involves determining which types of dispute may be resolved by
arbitration and which belong exclusively to the domain of the courts”);
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 767 (2009)
(“[Arbitrability] refers to subjects or disputes which are deemed by a
particular national law to be incapable of resolution by arbitration, even if
the parties have otherwise validly agreed to arbitrate such matters. ”);
Loukas A. Mistelis, Arbitrability – International and Comparative Perspectives:
Is Arbitrability a National or International Law Issue?, in ARBITRABILITY:
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1, 3-4, (2009).
(“Arbitrability …involves the simple question of what types of issues can
and cannot be submitted to arbitration and whether specific classes of
disputes are exempt from arbitration proceedings. While party autonomy
espouses the right of parties to submit any dispute to arbitration, national
laws often impose restrictions or limitations on what matters can be
referred to and resolved by arbitration.”).
46 THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, 1958, arts. II(1), V(2)(a).
These sections are implemented in the United States by 9 U.S.C. §§201-08.
47 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985: with amendments as
adopted in 2006 (Vienna: United Nations, 2008), available at
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_a
rbitration.html.
45
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to arbitral jurisdiction, namely that the underlying claim may
not, as a matter of law, be submitted to arbitration.48
With respect to the timing of judicial intervention on
jurisdictional matters, the FAA creates no statutory
presumption that courts should await the award before
pronouncing themselves on an arbitrator’s authority to hear a
dispute.49 At any stage in the arbitral process, courts can
decide whether a particular matter has been (or can be)
submitted to arbitration, usually in the context of a motion to
compel arbitration or to stay litigation.50 As fully developed
below, the UNCITRAL Model Law has an additional
approach to these threshold issues.51
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court provide
practical instances on the methodology of determining these
jurisdictional questions by American courts. Usually, to
allocate the jurisdictional authority between courts and
arbitrators, the court looks at the kind of jurisdictional issue
involved in the case. Thus, the threshold issues are usually
divided into procedural and substantive arbitrability issues.

Bermann, supra note 13, at 12.
Park, supra note 29, at 156.
50 See United States (Federal) Arbitration Act, supra note 4.
51 Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides for courts
determination of these issues at the preliminary stage of the proceedings
or after an award has been rendered. The important distinction, which is
the main purport of this paper, is to understand the consequences of the
court’s determination of these threshold issues as a preliminary matter. In
that case, particular restrictions come into play with respect to timing and
appeals of the court’s review of arbitrator’s determinations.
48
49
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1. PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY
Time limits is an issue that the court has characterized
as “procedural”. In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,52 a
majority of the Supreme Court held that arbitrators should be
allowed to decide this timing issue in the first instance, since
it represents a matter that “parties would likely expect that an
arbitrator would decide.”53 According to the Court,
“‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and
bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the
judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.”54 Therefore, The Court
in Howsam concluded that a question on time limits for
arbitration is one that, had they thought about the matter, the
parties to a contract containing an arbitration clause would
most likely have expected an arbitral tribunal to decide.55
The Supreme Court in Howsam did not catalogue “[the]
‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and
bear on its final disposition,”56 but lower courts have
identified other examples and handled them accordingly. For
instance, a party resisting arbitration may argue that its
opponent, whether by words or conduct, waived its right to
invoke an agreement to arbitrate. Like time limits on
arbitration, waiver of this sort targets the obligation to
arbitrate rather than the contract’s substantive obligations

Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., supra note 41, at 79.
Id. at 84.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 85; see also Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406
U.S. 487, 491 (1972) (holding that a defense of laches must be decided by
the arbitral tribunal).
56 Id. at 79 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557
(1964)).
52
53
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and should be treated as issues meant for the court rather than
arbitrators. However, current case law tells a different story.
In fact, courts commonly leave the question of waiver of the
right to arbitrate for the arbitrators to decide, even if raised at
the outset, often citing Howsam.57 Even so, the decisions are
not uniform in that regard. A good number of courts have
drawn a distinction between contract-based waiver and
conduct-based waiver, holding that the former is for the
arbitral tribunal to decide, while the latter may be determined
at the threshold by a court.58 This provides one instance of

57 See, e.g., Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384-94 (2d Cir.
2011); Pro Tech Indus., Inc. v. URS Corp., 377 F.3d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir. 2004);
Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1109-10 (11th Cir. 2004); Banc
One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2004); Feldman v.
Empire Today, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44574, at *4-6 (N.D. III. Apr. 26,
2011); Josko v. New World Sys. Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64681, at *25-28
(D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2006); cf. Mulvaney Mech., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l
Ass’n, Local 38, 351 F.3d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the question
of whether conduct constituted contract termination was an issue for the
district court, and not an arbitration panel).
58 See JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 393-94 (6th Cir.
2008) (holding that a party’s deliberate effort to derail arbitration sought
by its opponent would constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate, though
a deliberate effort was not established in this case). The court observed
that, most often, conduct-based waiver is established by a party’s failure
to invoke arbitration in a timely fashion after being sued or its interference
with a plaintiff’s pre-litigation efforts to arbitrate. Id. at 394; see also
Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Assocs., P.A., 387 F. App’x 921 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (finding that a party’s litigation activity was not so extensive and
the burden caused to the other party was not so great as to warrant a
finding of waiver), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011), cert. dismissed, 131
S. Ct. 2955 (2011); Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding that an employer statement that an employee’s claim is not
ripe for arbitration does not amount to a waiver); Khan v. Parsons Global
Servs. Ltd., 521 F.3d 421, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that filing a motion
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confusion and lack of clarity in the US with respect to
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. This lack of clarity is based on the fact
that Kompetenz-Kompetenz is, to a large extent, hinged on the
US understanding of arbitrability.
Further, there may be certain requirements the parties
must comply with before they initiate arbitration. Whether a
party complies with these preconditions59 is undoubtedly a
threshold issue, and arbitration-clause-specific. Thus, by
authority of First Options, should be left for the court to
determine. While judicial practice is mixed, courts often
characterize such matters as “procedural” and refer them for
decision by arbitrators in the first instance.60 Again, this

for summary judgment waives the right to invoke arbitration); Ehleiter v.
Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a
party seeking arbitration waived that right by actively litigating its
opponent’s claims); Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 3, 12-13
(1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting the argument that the failure to invoke arbitration
during the pendency of administrative proceedings before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission constituted waiver); Windward
Agency, Inc. v. Cologne Life Reins. Co., 123 F. App’x 481, 484 (3d Cir. 2005)
(finding that appellant’s failure to comply with the district court’s order
to initiate arbitration proceedings for many years constituted a timeliness
issue for the district court to decide); Tristar Fin. Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Equicredit Corp. of Am., 97 F. App’x 462, 464 (5 th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(holding that delaying the motion to compel does not amount to waiver);
Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350
F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that declining arbitration by letter
constitutes waiver).
59 These preconditions may include submitting the dispute first to
mediation or conciliation, or exhaust other remedies before initiating
arbitration.
60 See, e.g. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557-59 (1964).
See also Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Broadspire Mgmt. Servs., 623 F.3d 476,
477 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that whether necessary preconditions to
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mixed judicial attitude is a consequence of the lack of clear
textual basis under the FAA for Kompetenz-Kompetenz.
Notably, the “local litigation” requirement in BG Group was
characterized as a procedural precondition. Thus, in resolving
the dispositive issue as to “who-court or arbitrator-bears
primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the local
litigation requirement to an underlying controversy?,” the
Court held that the matter is for the arbitrators.61
Sometimes, a party resisting arbitration maintains that
the dispute sought to be arbitrated has already been
adjudicated, resulting in a judgment or award entitled to
claim-preclusive effect, so that the case should not be heard
again, either in arbitration or litigation. This is the issue of res
judicata. This objection, too, is arbitration-specific, and should
be for the courts to determine. Moreover, it makes little sense
to enforce an agreement to arbitrate if the outcome of the
dispute has already been determined as a matter of law.

arbitration have been satisfied is a question for the arbitrator); 3M Co. v.
Amex Sec., Inc., 542 F.3d 1193, 1200 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that condition
precedent is a matter of procedural arbitrability, which is decided by the
arbitrator); JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 392 (6th Cir.
2008); Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Ironworkers, Shopman’s Local 493 v. EFCO Corp.,
359 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the timeliness of procedural
steps as a precondition to arbitration is an issue for the arbitrator); Stroh
Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 748 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding
that failure to comply with pre-arbitration steps in a grievance procedure
is an issue of procedural arbitrability for the arbitrator). But see, Welborn
Clinic v. Medquist, Inc., 301 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2002) (compelling
arbitration since, under Indiana law, time limits and other requirements
are not conditions precedent).
61 BG Group v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198, 1206. (2014).
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However, in practice, courts almost invariably reserve the
claim preclusion question for the arbitrators.62
The availability of class arbitration is another threshold
issue of the procedural category. The question of whether a
dispute is susceptible of class arbitration goes primarily to the
arbitration clause rather than the main contract, and so is yet
another matter that would ordinarily be appropriate for the
court to determine. However, available cases do not reflect
that. Thus, in Green Tree v. Bazzle, the Supreme Court
characterized the question, whether the parties contemplated
class arbitration of their dispute, as one that the parties would
have expected the arbitral tribunal to decide.63 Although the
Court’s later decision in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animalfeeds
International Corp.64 laid down a standard that makes it
decidedly more difficult for arbitrators to conclude that the
parties contemplated class arbitration,65 that determination

See, e.g. Shell Oil Co. v. CO2 Comm., Inc.,589 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (10th Cir.
2009); Triangle Constr. & Maint. Corp. v. Our V.I. Labor Union, 425 F.3d 938,
947 (11th Cir. 2005); Klay v. United Healthgroup, 376 F.3d 1092, 1109-10 (11th
Cir. 2004); Shanks v. Swift Transp. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55063 (S.D.
Tex. June 19, 2008); Enter. Assoc. Metal Trades Branch Local Union 638 v.
Empire Mech., Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4749 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1992). But
see FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. Alt, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5853 (1st Cir. Mar.
23, 2011).
63 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003).
64 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. et. al., v. Animalfeeds Int’l. Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774
(2010).
65 Id. at 1775 (“[A] party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that
the party agreed to do so.”); See also AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011) (barring California from treating class arbitration waivers
as unenforceable, essentially finding such a prohibition to be inconsistent
with the FAA).
62
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nevertheless remains one for the arbitral tribunal to make in
the first instance.66
Courts will refer issues of this “procedural” sort to the
arbitrators. Although the strength of the argument in favor of
referring these questions to an arbitral tribunal may vary from
issue to issue and from case to case it will be more useful to
treat these entire series of objections to arbitration in a
consistent and predictable manner. This is particularly
necessary under the FAA because of the absence of defined
authority for arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction.
This situation is comparable to the clear position under the
UNCITRAL Model Law.67
The foregoing depicts the uncertainty in classifying
issues of arbitrability in US courts. From a logical standpoint,
most of these issues relate to arbitration-specific questions.
Thus, based on First Options, they should not be treated as
mere procedural issues but questions that go to the very heart
of the arbitration.
Instances have come up more recently as to how
Howsam’s framework has proven difficult to apply in practice.
In Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, for example, the plaintiff
sued his former employer for employment discrimination,
and the defendant responded by seeking to compel
arbitration pursuant to a written arbitration agreement that
expressly delegated to the arbitrator the “exclusive authority
to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation,
applicability, enforceability or formation of” the arbitration

See, e.g., Guida v. Home Savings of Am., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69159,
at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2011).
67
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, Art. 16(1), at 8, (2006).
66
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agreement itself.68 The plaintiff opposed arbitration on the
ground that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable
under controlling state law.69 A split court ruled that the
plaintiff’s unconscionability argument was for the arbitrator,
not the court. The reasoning was that this argument was
directed at the arbitration agreement as a whole and not at the
specific provision. The court characterized the agreement as
antecedent, severable agreement, thereby vesting the
arbitrator with authority to adjudicate challenges to
enforceability of the agreement as a whole.70 Characterizing
the entire arbitration agreement as a single facet of a broader
employment agreement, the dissent argued that under First
Options the plaintiff’s unconscionability argument was a
question of arbitrability requiring judicial resolution.71
Rent-A-Center shows continued uncertainty regarding
how courts identify questions of arbitrability. The same
uncertainty was raised in the Second Circuit’s 2014 decision
in NASDAQ Group, Inc. v. UBS Securities, LLC.72 There, a
broker-dealer sought to arbitrate claims against the NASDAQ
exchange related to the exchange’s alleged mishandling of the
Facebook IPO.73 Although the parties had an agreement
containing a broad arbitration clause that would otherwise
have constituted “clear and unmistakable” evidence of an
intent to vest the arbitration panel with authority to
determine arbitrability, the clause was expressly drafted
subject to a set of NASDAQ rules that arguably immunized

Rent-A- Center, West, Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 65-66 (2010).
Id. at 66.
70 Id. at 70-73.
71 Id. at 80-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. v. UBS Sec., LLC., 770 F.3d 1010 (2d Cir. 2014).
73 Id. at 1016-17.
68
69
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the exchange from liability for the sorts of claims asserted by
the broker-dealer.74 Rather than construing the NASDAQ
rules as raising the sort of defense to liability that Howsam
suggested would be subject to resolution by the arbitrator, the
Second Circuit ruled that reference to the rules in the
arbitration clause itself raised an ambiguity regarding
whether the parties had in fact intended to vest the arbitrator
with authority to determine the arbitrability of the specific
claims asserted.75
In short, while First Options purported to answer the
question of who decides arbitrability, it appears that the focus
shifted from the question “who decides” to the question
“what is being decided.” Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts
to resolve that issue in Howsam, it is clear that confusion and
uncertainty remains.
2. SUBSTANTIVE ARBITRABILITY
Every other threshold issue not characterized as
“procedural”, is, at least a priori, substantive and are to be
decided by the court. Generally, issues such as “[w]hether the
parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a
concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type
of controversy”76 are characterized as substantive
arbitrability issues. This is however not always clear. For
instance, threshold disputes over the applicability of an
arbitration agreement present courts with a dilemma. This is
the elusive “scope” of arbitration question. From a

Id. at 1031-32.
Id.
76 Green Tree Fin. Corp, supra note 63, at 452.
74
75
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separability viewpoint, such matters are substantive
arbitrability matters, because they relate specifically and
uniquely to the arbitration clause rather than to the contract
as a whole. Moreover, they significantly implicate party
consent. In that connection, the legitimacy of the proceedings
and the eventual award. Parties do not agree to arbitrate
every imaginable dispute that may arise between them. They
agree to arbitrate only a certain universe of claims that they
themselves have defined.
Questions concerning the scope of an agreement to
arbitrate are accordingly often ranged alongside the question
of whether an arbitration agreement was formed, whether it
is valid and enforceable, and whether a given person is or
may be deemed a party to it.77 They are therefore substantive
arbitrability issues left for courts to determine. There are
several arguments as to where the question of scope properly
belongs. However, that is slightly beyond the scope of this
paper.78
III.

KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ
MODEL LAW

UNDER

THE

UNCITRAL

The situation with regard to the process of determining
arbitral jurisdiction is different under the Model law. It is
different in two main respects, namely (1) under the
UNCITRAL Model Law, there is a clear textual basis for
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, and (2) under the UNCITRAL Model

Bermann, supra note 13, at 37.
See generally, Mark Berger, Arbitration and Arbitrability: Toward an
Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 753 (2004).
77
78
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Law, there is stipulation of a time limit for challenge of
arbitral determination on their own jurisdiction.
A. TEXTUAL FOUNDATION FOR KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ
Unlike the FAA, the UNCITRAL Model Law expressly
provides for the authority of arbitral tribunals to decide on
their jurisdiction, if challenged.79 In this regard, article 16 of
the UNCITRAL Model Law provides as follows:
The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own
jurisdiction, including any objections with
respect to the existence or validity of the
arbitration agreement.80
In addition, article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model law provides
that:
A court before which an action is brought in a
matter which is the subject of an arbitration
agreement shall, if a party so requests not later
than when submitting his first statement on the
substance of the dispute, refer the parties to
arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.81

See, UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 67.
Id.
81 Id.
79
80
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Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law is quite similar
in effect to sections 3 and 4 of the FAA which authorizes the
relevant US district court to stay judicial proceedings and
compel arbitration in proceedings referable to arbitration.
German law, which is fashioned towards the UNCITRAL
Model Law, is also similar in this respect. It allows for broad
judicial intervention on certain issues at the threshold of
arbitration. Section 1032(1) of the German Civil Procedure
Code (“ZPO”) entitles the defendant in a court action on a
claim that it contends is subject exclusively to arbitration to
seek a ruling that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the
matter on the merits. To prevail on the jurisdictional issue,
plaintiff must demonstrate that the arbitration agreement is
“null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.”82
However, the difference is American courts may
entertain applications for jurisdictional declarations at any
time.83 They may order a full examination of the validity of an

82 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Jan. 30,
1877, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 83, as amended, § 1032, ¶ 1, translated
in Peter Hubert, § 1032 – Arbitration Agreement and Substantive Claim
Before Court, in ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE
139 (Karl-Heinz Böckstiegal, Stefan Michael Kröll & Patricia Nacimiento
eds., 2007) (“A court before which an action is brought in a matter which
is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if the respondent raises an
objection prior to the beginning of the oral hearing on the substance of the
dispute, reject the action as inadmissible unless the court finds that the
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed”). The language of section 1032(1) tracks Article 8(1) of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, whose language “null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed” derives from Article II (3) of the New York
Convention.
83 See Park, supra note 29, at 139.
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arbitration clause at any stage of the arbitral process to
determine whether , as a matter of fact and law, the parties
have agreed to arbitrate.84 Under the Model law, such delay
may be a waiver.85 In this regard, article 16(2) provides that:
A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have
jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the
submission of the statement of defense. A party is
not precluded from raising such a plea by the
fact that he has appointed, or participated in the
appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the
arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its
authority shall be raised as soon as the matter
alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is
raised during the arbitral proceedings. The
arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a
later plea if it considers the delay justified.
Certainly, an argument can be made that based on the
last sentence of this provision, the tribunal has discretion to
entertain an objection regarding its own jurisdiction.
However, it is important to notice that the requirement
objecting before the submission of the statement of defense is
couched in mandatory terms by the use of the word “shall.”
The tribunal may only admit a subsequent plea in rare

See, e.g. Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
See, UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 67. In this respect, Art. 16(2) of
the UNICTRAL Model Law provides that (“A plea that the arbitral
tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the
submission of the statement of defence”); Similarly, Art. 4 of the
UNICTRAL Model Law provides for (“Waiver of right to object”).

84
85
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circumstances because of the wording of the provision. This
is an important issue to also consider in terms of the efficiency
of arbitration under the UNCITRAL Model Law regime, as
opposed to the United States system under the FAA. The
American position is different from several other
jurisdictions. For instance, if German courts are asked to hear
a matter which one side asserts is subject to arbitration, they
decide immediately on the validity and scope of the
arbitration agreement.86 In France, such challenges normally
wait until an award has been made.87 In England, litigants
have a right to declaratory decisions on arbitral authority, but
only if they take no part in the arbitration.88
In addition, the UNCITRAL Model Law expressly
prevents unnecessary intervention by the courts. The Model
law provides that “[i]n matters governed by this law, no court
shall intervene except where so provided in this Law.”89 The
FAA does not have a similar provision, making arbitration
under the FAA less efficient compared to proceedings under
the UNCITRAL Model Law. A follow up question would be
whether the US is as pro-arbitration as it is said to be? It is
difficult to say that this pro-arbitration perception is accurate
in light of the possible ways in which the FAA needs to be
improved.

ZPO, supra note 82, at § 1032(1).
Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile [N.C.P.C.], art. 1458. This permits
pre-arbitration review only to determine if the arbitration clause is
“clearly void” (manifestement nulle).
88 English Arbitration Act 1996, c. 27 (Eng.) § 72 (1996). In a sense, this is
similar to the UNCITRAL Model Law which limits the right to object to
situations where the objecting party has not waived the right based on the
grounds provided under the Model Law.
89 See, UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 67, at art. 5.
86
87
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LIMITS ON REVIEW OF ARBITRATOR’S DETERMINATION

Not only does the UNCITRAL Model Law expressly
stipulate that an arbitral tribunal has the competence to rule
on its own jurisdiction,90 it also authorizes the tribunal to rule
on the jurisdictional challenge as a preliminary question.91 In
that regard, the Model Law provides that:
If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary
question that it has jurisdiction, any party may
request, within thirty days after having received
notice of that ruling, the court … to decide the
matter, which decision shall be subject to no
appeal…”92
Two important features are available under the
UNCITRAL Model Law regime, which do not exist under the
FAA. These are critical features which are likely to impact the
time spent in resolving a dispute, depending on which law
applies as the lex arbitri. These features include: (1) the thirtyday time limit within which a party may seek a review of
arbitral determination on jurisdiction, and (2) the fact that a
finding from a court on the said arbitral determination on
jurisdiction is “subject to no appeal.” These differences
between the FAA and the UNCITRAL Model Law are
significant. They play out when one side to the dispute
applies to a court with supervisory (curial) competence over
the arbitration, asking that the proceedings be stopped or that

Id. at Art. 16.
Id.
92 Id.
90
91
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a case be heard notwithstanding an alleged arbitration
agreement. This happens a majority of the time in arbitral
proceedings and as such, the importance of these provisions
cannot be overemphasized.
In BG Group, Argentina claimed that the tribunal
lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute because (1) BG Group
was not a Treaty-protected investor; (2) BG Group’s interest
in MetroGAS was not a Treaty-protected investment; and (3)
BG Group initiated arbitration without litigating its claims in
Argentina’s courts, despite Article 8’s local litigation
requirement.93 In late December 2007, the arbitration panel in
BG Group determined it had jurisdiction to consider the merits
of the dispute. Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, as soon as
that decision on jurisdiction was rendered, parties would
have an automatic right to seek a review by the relevant court
of the seat. Further, a decision of such a court would be open
to review for thirty days after which a party loses the right to
seek further review of that decision. What is more, such a
decision is not subject to appeal.
Contrasting this UNCITRAL Model Law position with
what happened in BG Group, we find that Argentina first
applied to the District Court for the District of Columbia
seeking to vacate the award in part on the ground that the
arbitrators lacked jurisdiction.94 The District Court denied
Argentina’s claims. Under the Model Law, appeals would
have ended and the decision of the arbitrators would have
prevailed. However, since the dispute was decided under the
FAA, Argentina had the right to further appeal, and it did so.
Argentina appealed the District Court’s decision to the Court

93
94

BG Group, PLC, v. Rep. 134 U.S. 1198, 1204 (2014).
Id. at 1205.
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of Appeals for the district of Columbia Circuit. The DC Circuit
reversed the arbitral determination on jurisdiction. In the
Court of Appeal’s view, the interpretation and application of
Article 8’s local litigation requirement was a matter for courts
to decide de novo, i.e. without deference to the views of the
arbitrators.95 Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the
circumstances did not excuse BG Group’s failure to comply
with the requirement. Rather, BG Group must “commence a
lawsuit in Argentina’s courts and wait eighteen months
before filing for arbitration.”96 Because BG Group had not
done so, the arbitrators lacked authority to decide the dispute.
The Court of Appeals ordered the award vacated.
The judicial challenge did not end there. BG Group
appealed to the Supreme Court. Appealing arbitral
determination on jurisdiction without restriction defeats the
purpose of international arbitration. It is essentially bringing
a dispute under the domestic court system of the seat of
arbitration. This could lead to the so-called “Russian Doll”
effect, where arbitral decisions are appealed all the way to the
highest court.97 The point here is that from 2007 when the
jurisdictional issue was determined by the tribunal, parties
took turns in appealing that decision to the highest court in
the United States. The final decision was issued in 2014. Thus,
for about seven years, parties fought over whether the

Id.
Id.
97 Marike R. P. Paulsson, Comissa v. PEMEX Thethe Sequel: Are the Floodgates
Opened? The Russian Doll Effect Further Defined, KLUWER ARBITRATION
BLOG_(August_11,_2016),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/08/11/reservedpemex-decision/.
95
96
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tribunal had jurisdiction (although the merits formed part of
the appeal).
Judges in the United States, particularly in locations such as
Washington, D.C., New York, California, etc. are quite
familiar with arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.
Even so, the BG Group case took seven years from the
tribunal’s decision to finally lay the issue of arbitral
jurisdiction to rest at the US Supreme Court. One wonders
how this would play out in other less arbitration-friendly
jurisdictions, especially ones that have not adopted
progressive laws such as the UNCITRAL Model Law. It
would take much longer–the more reason jurisdictions need
to adopt arbitration laws with efficient regulation of the
proceedings.
C. STANDARDS OF REVIEW OF ARBITRAL DETERMINATION
In addition to adopting a unique form of “arbitrability”
as a tool in determining competency to decide jurisdictional
issues lies, U.S. Courts have also adopted certain standards of
review in the allocation of said competence. The most
significant dividing line relates to whether the judge will
make a full inquiry into the parties’ intent, or simply a
summary examination, applying what is sometimes called a
prima facie or deferential standard. To a large extent, the
jurisprudence regarding the standards of review mirrors the
analysis under procedural and substantive arbitrability.98
Thus, issues characterized as those of procedural arbitrability
are generally for the arbitrator to determine. Courts generally

See subheading III(C)(1) & (2) above, on procedural and substantive
arbitrability.

98
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engage in deferential or prima facie review with regard to
those issues. On the other hand, issues of substantive
arbitrability are for the courts to review de novo, without any
deference to the arbitrator’s determination.
For example, a seller might bring a judicial action to
collect the price of an engine. In response, the buyer (who
alleges the engine was defective) might move to stay
litigation, asserting that the parties had agreed to arbitrate
their dispute. The seller might reply with allegations that the
arbitration clause was void.
In the alternative, the buyer might file an arbitration
for product malfunction, alleging an engine explosion that
caused personal injury and loss of profits. Here, it would be
the seller (preferring to be in court) who asks a judge to
address the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement,
perhaps arguing that the person who signed the clause lacked
authority or that the clause was not broad enough to cover the
tort action for personal injury or the financial claim for lost
profits.
In either instance, judges will need to decide whether
to examine arbitral jurisdiction in depth or to do so
deferentially or under summary (prima facie) standard. In the
latter event, they may leave fuller review to the time after an
award has been rendered.
In France, until an award is rendered, judges address
the validity and scope of an arbitration clause only in the most
superficial manner and only in the event no arbitral tribunal
has been constituted.99 The court can ask whether the clause
was clearly void (for example, whether the arbitration clause
exists at all) but may not address more complex questions,

99

N.C.P.C., supra note 87, at art. 1458.
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such as whether the corporate officer signing the arbitration
agreement had authority to do so. Once arbitration has started
however, judges sit on their hands until the award is made.100
By contrast, U.S. courts may engage in full examination
of arbitral power regardless of whether the arbitration has
begun, and irrespective of whether they are being asked to
hear the merits of the claims. The court might decide that the
lawsuit should stop and the arbitration should proceed. Or
vice versa. The court might also pass this jurisdictional
question back to the arbitrators themselves for their
determination.101
As a general matter, a prima facie standard would be
relevant only with respect to pre-award requests for
declarations and injunctions, which implicate a prophylactic
role for courts in the sense of preventing an arbitrator from

Compare the Canadian case of Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des
consommateurs [2007] S.C.R. 34 (Can.) (where The Canadian Supreme
Court opted for the minimum standard of review at the time an arbitration
begins. The Canadian decision interpreted the jurisdictional provisions of
the UNCITRAL Model Law as enacted in Québec. Unlike the French
statute, however, the Model Law permits judicial intervention even after
arbitration has commenced); See generally Frédéric Bachand, Does Article 8
of the Model Law Call for Full or Prima Facie Review of the Arbitral Tribunal’s
Jurisdiction? 22 ARB. INT’L 463 (2006).
101 In some countries, courts distinguish between arbitration held at home
or abroad. Swiss courts, for example, make a comprehensive review of the
validity of the arbitration clause when the arbitration has its seat abroad.
By contrast, when the arbitration is held in Switzerland, judges engage
only in a summary examination of arbitral jurisdiction (examen sommaire)
delaying fuller review until the award stage. Compare Swiss Tribunal
federal decisions in Fondation M. Banque X, ATF 122 III 139 (Apr. 29, 1996)
(arbitration in Switzerland), with Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA
v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co. SA. ATF 121 III 38 (Jan. 16, 1995)
(arbitration abroad).
100
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making an unauthorized decision. The jurisdictional
foundation of an arbitral proceeding must be monitored
before anyone knows what the arbitrator will decide. The
arbitrator’s jurisdiction becomes an issue because judges are
asked to make a respondent participate, or tell a claimant that
the arbitration lacks jurisdictional foundation.102
By contrast, when arbitral jurisdiction becomes an
issue in the endgame, after an award is rendered, judges
exercise a remedial function, correcting mistakes that allegedly
occurred earlier in the arbitral process. The validity of an
award might be subject to judicial scrutiny at the arbitral seat,
through motions to vacate or to confirm under local law,103 or
to recognize an award rendered abroad under the New York
Convention. At this point, a different set of concerns present
themselves, calling for a deeper judicial scrutiny of both the
arbitrator’s jurisdiction and the relevant public policy
implications of the award.
IV.

BRIEF COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

As mentioned earlier, the struggle to determine who
decides questions of arbitrability is largely an American
phenomenon, the result of the FAA’s silence on the issue and
the American court’s subsequent need to develop rules of
decision in light of perceived Congressional intent and
fundamental principles of contract law. Other jurisdictions
have managed to avoid the lasting uncertainty catalogued
above by codifying the rules of decision.

See United States (Federal) Arbitration Act supra note 4.
Id. (See for instance, 9 U.S.C.§ 10 which provides for vacatur of an
award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers”).
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103
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In France, the Code of Civil Procedure expressly vests
arbitration tribunals with “exclusive jurisdiction” to
determine their jurisdiction.104 The Code also provides that
the existence of an arbitration agreement divests the courts of
jurisdiction entirely, except where the arbitration panel “has
not yet been seized of the dispute” and the arbitration
agreement is “manifestly void or manifestly not applicable” –
an exception that is strictly interpreted.105 Application of this
principle, “compétence-compétence,” means that even where
the arbitration tribunal’s jurisdiction is in question, the
arbitration tribunal itself enjoys “chronological priority” to
decide the issue and the courts remain divested of jurisdiction
unless the parties mutually consent to judicial intervention.106
This is commonly referred to as negative KompetenzKompetenz.107
Whereas the American approach to the question of
who determines arbitrability is directed primarily at
vindicating the parties’ contract, the French approach places
a greater premium on preventing dilatory tactics and
encouraging the centralized and efficient resolution of all
disputes surrounding the subject of the arbitration. This does
not mean, however, that the courts have no role. It simply
means that whereas American courts exercise chronological

N.C.P.C., supra note 87, at Art. 1465.
Id. at Art. 1448 para. 1
106 Id. at Art. 1448 para. 2. (stating court “may not decline jurisdiction on
its own motion,” giving parties the ability to jointly consent to judicial
intervention).
107 See Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, Negative Effect of CompetenceCompetence; The Role of Priority in Favour of the Arbitrators, in ENFORCEMENT
OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS:
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE, 260.
104
105
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precedence, acting as a gate-keeper to arbitration, the French
courts act as a back-stop. In that sense, the French courts
exercise a limited review of the arbitration panel’s decision –
including its decision regarding arbitrability – once that
decision had been delivered.108
English law strikes something of a balance between the
American and French approaches. Like the French Code, the
English Arbitration Act expressly empowers an arbitration
panel to “rule on its own substantive jurisdiction,” including
“what matters have been submitted to arbitration in
accordance with the arbitration agreement.”109 Unlike the
French approach, however, the English courts are not
divested of jurisdiction,110 and may be called on to make a
determination as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
(and hence the arbitrability of the parties’ dispute) – but only
when all parties agree to seek such ruling, or when the
tribunal itself allows a party to do so.111 Otherwise, a party
must await issuance of an award before challenging the
arbitration panel’s arbitrability determination.112

See N.C.P.C., supra note 87, at Art. 1492, para. 1 (allowing a court to “set
aside” domestic award where the “arbitral tribunal wrongly upheld or
declined jurisdiction”); See also Id. at Art. 1520, para. 1 (which holds the
same with respect to international awards).
109 See English Arbitration Act (1996), supra note 88.
110 Id. at § 9.
111 Id. at § 32.
112 Id. at § 67(1).
108
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BG GROUP MAJORITY OPINION

A. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND DECISION
Article 8 of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between
the United Kingdom and the Republic of Argentina contained
a requirement which authorized a party to submit a dispute
“to the decision of the competent tribunal of the Contracting
Party in whose territory the investment was made,”113 such as
a local court, and allowed arbitration, “where, after a period
of eighteen months has elapsed from the moment when the
dispute was submitted to [that] tribunal…, the said tribunal
has not given its final decision.” (the local litigation
requirement).114 BG Group PLC, a British firm, belonged to a
consortium with a majority interest in MetroGAS, an
Argentine entity awarded an exclusive license to distribute
natural gas in Buenos Aires.
At about the same period when BG Group’s
consortium acquired the interest in MetroGAS, Argentina
enacted statutes providing that regulators would calculate
gas “tariffs” in US dollars, and that those tariffs would be set
at levels sufficient to assure gas distribution firms, such as
MetroGAS, a reasonable return on their investment in the
country.115
In 2001 and 2002, Argentina, faced with economic
crisis, enacted new laws which changed the calculation of gas
tariffs from Dollars to Pesos. The effect was that MetroGAS

BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198, 1201 (2014).
Id.
115 Id. at 1204
113
114
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started losing money. BG Group believed that the changes,
among others, violated the Treaty. A dispute arose.116
In 2003, BG Group submitted the dispute to arbitration.
Parties agreed that the seat of arbitration would be
Washington, DC. BG Group essentially claimed that
Argentina’s new laws and regulatory practices violated
provisions in the BIT forbidding the “expropriation” of
investments and requiring that each nation give “fair and
equitable treatment” to investors from the other.117 Argentina
denied these claims, while also arguing that the arbitration
tribunal lacked “jurisdiction” to hear the dispute. According
to Argentina, the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction because: (1)
BG Group was not a Treaty-protected “investor;” (2) BG
Group’s interest in MetroGAS was not a Treaty-protected
“investment;” and (3) BG Group initiated arbitration without
first litigating its claims in Argentina’s courts, despite the
Article 8 local litigation requirement. Argentina’s argument
on the jurisdictional issue was that, failure by BG Group to
bring its grievance to Argentine courts for 18 months
rendered its claims in the arbitration inadmissible.118
In December 2007, the tribunal determined that it had
jurisdiction. The tribunal concluded that BG Group was an
investor, that its interest in MetroGAS amounted to a Treatyprotected investment, and that Argentina’s conduct waived,
or excused, BG Group’s failure to comply with Article 8’s
local litigation requirement. These conducts include, among
others, the fact that the President of Argentina issued a decree
staying the execution of its courts’ final judgment for 180 days

Id.
Id.
118 Id.
116
117
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in suits claiming harm as a result of the new economic
measures. In addition, Argentina established a renegotiation
process for public service contracts such as its contract with
MetroGAS, to alleviate the negative impact of the new
economic measures. However, Argentina simultaneously
barred from participation in that process firms that were
litigating against Argentina in court or arbitration. Thus,
requiring a private party in such circumstances to seek relief
in Argentina’s courts for 18 months, the tribunal concluded,
would lead to absurd and unreasonable results. Therefore, on
the merits, the tribunal agreed with Argentina that it had not
“expropriated” BG Group’s investment, but also found that
Argentina had denied BG Group “fair and equitable
treatment.” The tribunal awarded BG Group $185 Million in
damages.119
In March 2008, both parties filed petitions for review in
the District Court for the District of Columbia—BG Group to
confirm the award under the New York Convention and the
FAA, and Argentina to vacate the award, in part, because the
tribunal lacked jurisdiction. The District Court denied
Argentina’s claims and confirmed the award.120 The Court of
Appeals, D.C. Circuit, reversed. In the D.C. Circuit’s view, the
interpretation and application of Article 8’s local litigation
requirement was a matter for courts to decide de novo, without
deference to the views of the arbitrators. The court held that
the circumstances in Argentina did not excuse BG Group’s
failure to comply with the requirement. Rather, BG Group
must “commence[d] a lawsuit in Argentina’s courts and wait
eighteen months before filing for arbitration.” Because BG

119
120

Id. at 1204–1206.
Id. at 1206.
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Group had not done so, the arbitrators lacked authority to
decide the dispute. The D.C. Circuit ordered the award
vacated.121
BG Group appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. The issue there was: who, court or arbitrator, bears
primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the local
litigation provision of the BIT? In other words, should a US
court review the arbitrators’ interpretation and application of
the provision de novo, or with the deference that courts
ordinarily show arbitral decisions on matters the parties have
committed to arbitration? The Court held that the matter was
for the arbitrators, and courts must review the arbitrators’
determinations with deference.122
B.

APPLICATION OF ARBITRABILITY
KOMPETENZ IN BG GROUP

AND

KOMPETENZ-

In dealing with the issue at hand, the Supreme Court
started out by treating the treaty in question as an ordinary
contract between private parties. The Court restated the
general position that where ordinary contracts are in issue, it
is up to the parties to determine whether a particular matter
is primarily for arbitrators or for courts to decide.123 The Court
went ahead to state that “[I]f the contract is silent on the
matter of who primarily is to decide ‘threshold’ questions

Id.
Id.
123 Id. at 1207; See also, Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960) (“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to
so submit”).
121
122
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about arbitration, courts determine the parties’ intent with the
help of presumptions.”124
As mentioned earlier, on one hand, US courts generally
presume that parties intend courts, not arbitrators, to decide
“disputes about arbitrability.”125 On the other hand, when the
arbitrability question has to do with the meaning and
application of particular procedural preconditions for the use
of arbitration, courts presume that the parties intend
arbitrators, not courts, to decide such disputes.126 Thus, the
Supreme Court decided that the local litigation requirement
of the BIT was of the procedural variety because the text and
structure of the provision clearly makes it operate as a
procedural condition precedent to arbitration.127 This, the
court reasoned, was based on the fact that the local litigation
requirement “determines when the contractual duty to
arbitrate arises, not whether there is a contractual duty to
arbitrate at all.”128 This was hinged on a couple of the Court’s
previous decisions. In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, the
Court held that whether a party filed notice of arbitration
within the time limit provided by the rules of the chosen
arbitral forum “is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator,
not for the judge.”129 Similarly, in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
Livingston, the Court held that a mandatory pre-arbitration
grievance procedure that involved holding two conferences

Id.
First Options, supra note 21, at 941, 943-947.
126 Howsam, supra note 41, at 79-84. (“courts assume parties ‘normally
expect a forum-based decision-maker to decide forum-specific procedural
gateway matters’”)
127 BG Group, supra note 61, at 1207.
128 Id.
129 Howsam, supra note 41, at 85.
124
125
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was presumptively for the judge to decide.130 Further, since
the BIT itself did not provide for anything contradicting this
presumption, the Court therefore concluded that the
arbitrators had the primary authority to interpret and apply
the local litigation provision.131
As a general matter, this is the default process
undertaken by American courts faced with questions of
arbitrability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz. It is unnecessary to go
through such a process in determining arbitral competence to
determine their own jurisdiction. It amounts to a waste of
judicial resources. Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, the
process is perfunctory. Article 16 provides that the arbitrator
has the authority to decide on their competence. It does not
require a court to delve into unnecessarily intricate analysis
of what is procedural or substantive. Under the UNCITRAL
Regime, as long as the challenge is geared towards the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, such tribunal always has the
power to determine the issue.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in BG Group,
it is important to take a step back and understand the
ramifications of the FAA on arbitration conducted in the
United States. When the FAA applies, much of the issues

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, (1964). See also, Dialysis
Access Center, LLC v. RMS Liefline, Inc., 638 F. 3d 367, 383 (1st Cir. 2011)
(the court held the same in respect to a pre-arbitration “good faith
negotiations” requirement); see also Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Broadspire
Management Servs., Inc., 623 F. 3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding the same,
in respect to a pre-arbitration filing of a “Disagreement Notice”).
131 BG Group, supra note 61, at 1208.
130
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relating to arbitrability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz are guided
by the framework which U.S. courts have established over
time. Parties do not consciously, with knowledge of the
implications, submit their disputes to this uncertain regime.
For the most part, parties who choose any state of the US as
the seat of their dispute do not fully understand the
consequences of such a choice. Often, hundreds of millions of
dollars are at stake in these disputes. It does not make sense
that parties would consciously want to leave such high-stakes
disputes to the vagaries of the US arbitration regime.
Particularly when they have the choice of a more stable and
predictable framework, the UNCITRAL Model Law.
It took 11 years for this dispute to be resolved. The
issue of jurisdiction was appealed through the US court
system all the way to the Supreme Court. Would it have been
different had the UNCITRAL Model Law applied as the lex
arbitri? Very likely yes. As already mentioned, first, the Model
Law expressly provides that arbitrators have the power to
determine their jurisdiction. With such express declaration,
there is little need to seek interpretation of the provision from
courts. Tribunals would simply apply the provision, and
parties get the outcome. Second, a review of such a decision
is to be sought within 30 days. Third, there is no appeal on
that decision under the Model Law. Undoubtedly, this would
make for a faster resolution of disputes in the US. In BG Group,
this would have meant that the District Court’s decision
confirming the award would have been the final recourse for
the parties. Interestingly, the Supreme Court upheld the
District Court’s decision years later. Considering the Supreme
Court’s decision was the same as the district court’s, it is fair
to say, at least in the BG Group case, that not limiting the
appeals process was a waste of judicial resources.
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In addition, this raises a curious question regarding the
wisdom behind “non-ICSID” investment arbitration cases. By
“opting out” of the ICSID system, parties subject their dispute
to so much unpredictability, especially if they do not choose
a seat that has fully adopted laws similar to the UNCITRAL
Model Law. This is exactly what happened in BG Group.
ICSID is a closed, self-contained system which provides for
faster and more efficient dispute resolution. Parties are better
off using the ICSID system than having their dispute heard
outside the system. Contracting states should therefore be
mindful of terms negotiated in the dispute resolution
provisions of their BITs.
The United States Congress must seriously consider
amending the FAA, if only to provide a textual basis for the
current jurisprudential position regarding KompetenzKompetenz. This will bring some certainty to the system. In
addition, there should be a time limit and limitation on the
appeals process, similar to the relevant provisions of the
UNCITRAL Model Law. This simple addition to the FAA
could prevent situations like the one in BG Group where the
issue of jurisdiction was appealed to the Supreme Court. If the
BG Group situation continues, then the whole essence of
international arbitration as a fast, efficient and cost-effective
means of dispute resolution would be defeated. As mention
earlier, this will encourage the so-called “Russian-Doll” effect,
which may discourage users of the process.
Further, there should be conscious effort by states to
avoid non-ICSID investment arbitration. Had BG Group been
decided under the ICSID framework, there is little doubt that
the dispute would have been decided much faster, saving
time and money. The ICSID system, like the UNCITRAL
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regime, expressly recognizes Kompetenz-Kompetenz.132 In
addition, awards from ICSID are not subject to any national
court review,133 even though they are seen as court judgments
of member states’ courts.134
From the foregoing, can one then say that the US is as
pro-arbitration as it claims to be? Until the FAA regime is
fixed to provide clear guidance on basic and important
arbitration issues like Kompetenz-Kompetenz, my position is
that the US is in fact not as pro-arbitration as it claims to be.
Certain things remain to be done in order to lift the country
to a complete pro-arbitration status. I believe that countries
that adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law are the quintessential
pro-arbitration systems. Any country that grapples with a
very basic feature of international arbitration should not be
seen as pro-arbitration. The rest of the world is settled on the
issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, but as seen in this paper, the
US is still having an unnecessary “difficult time.”

132 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 41, Mar. 19, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (“The
Tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence”).
133 Id. at art. 53(1). (“The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not
be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in
this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of
the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed
pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.”).
134 Id. at art. 54(1). (“Each Contracting State shall recognize an award
rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the
pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it
were a final judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a
federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal
courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were
a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.”).
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In the meantime, given the continued uncertainty
regarding how to determine who should decide these
“gateway” questions of arbitrability in the United States,
parties wishing to ensure resolution of such questions by a
specific decision-maker – whether court or the arbitrator—
should spell out their preference as clearly as possible.
Conversely, parties seeking to challenge a decision-maker’s
authority to decide arbitrability should be attentive to
circumstances that might implicate unresolved aspect of this
vexing issue. Parties who seek to avoid litigation over this
threshold question – and who are comfortable with having an
arbitration panel determine its own jurisdiction in the first
instance – may wish to consider contracting for arbitration in
France or the United Kingdom, where judicial involvement is
generally delayed until completion of the arbitration itself.
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